This is not a article  on how Tesla’s work on electromagnetism is subsumed within the football of Eastern Europe in the late 1970s. I wish it was, but it isn’t. No, it’s a post explaining the scarcity in posts recently.

Truth is, I’m engaged in work that has had me away from football since the turn of the year. To my knowledge, Roy Hodgson is still in charge at Liverpool, Gareth Bale is the best player in the world and Andy Gray & Richard Keys are respectable members of the Sky Sports team. I know no different.

I’ll be gracing the internet with my #newseriousness tag at the start of the summer.

For all Bayern München’s dominance in Germany in the 1980s, they made a pigs-ear out of things in Europe. It was a common sight to see the Barvarian side being disposed of by British clubs throughout the decade. In 1981, Liverpool beat Pál Csernai’s Munich side on away goals in the semi-final. Throughout that decade, they further lost to Alex Fergusons’s Aberdeen side, as well as Tottenham and Everton in various European championships.

However, none of these defeats would come close to the defeat handed to them in 1987 by FC Porto in the now titled Ernst-Happel-Stadion, Vienna. Die Bayern were seen as odds-on favourites and the entire club were assured that victory would assumingly come. Bayern München’s then president, Fritz Scherer, had sanguinely prepared his victory speech in anticipation of a triumphant conquest against the Portuguese side. Recently departed striker Uli Hoeneß, on the eve of the match, proclaimed that this match will spark the “dawning of a new, great era.”

Truthfully, they had good reason to be hopelessly optimistic in their chances of victory. Porto were without their talismanic striker, Fernando Gomes, who had won the European Golden Boot in 1983 and then in 1985. The striker, who went on to go and score 163 goals in 184 games for Porto, was withdrawn with a broken leg. Bayern München were not without casualties too, they had lost defensive stalwart, Klaus Augenthaler as well as striker Roland Wohlfarth, who famously was convicted for taking anorectics in the following decade.

Fernando Gomes: Porto's injured virtuoso man

In the first-half, it would have been understandable to see Fritz Scherer pacing the room, mouthing his acceptance speech, practicing his wink and smile as he saw his Bayern side govern the match.  Porto started the game in a narrow and deep 4-4-1-1 with Paulo Futre leading the line.  I say leading the line, but he habitually dropped deep to get involved with the play, leading to a situation where Porto were often found strikerless.  Bayern München found this easy to defend against with their back three / five.

First-half tactical line-ups.

The narrowness of Porto allowed Bayern’s wing-backs to maraud down the flanks.  This sanctioned Bayern’s midfield to have equal numbers in midfield as well as width to work with when in possession.  Without the ball, Paulo Futre didn’t look to press the defence, allowing Bayern’s central defenders to move into an auxiliary midfield position and control the integral central areas.

Futre's lethargy allowed Bayern to make up the numbers in midfield

One forward against three-centre backs would usually lead to an advantage for the team with the solo striker.  As Jonathan Wilson succintly points out, this is usually because of the redundant centre-back.  However Porto, who relied on Paulo Futre to create as well as score, didn’t take advantage as they looked to play negatively and keep narrow, with the full-backs looking to stay in their defensive roles.  The theoretical advantages of playing one striker against a traditional back three were therefore negated.

Porto’s narrowness played in the hands of the three-man defence as it allowed an easy reading of Porto’s [read: solo Futre run] attacks.  The first-half was subsequently dominated by the Bavarian side who controlled possession and were unlucky not to go into the break with more than a one-nil lead.  The goal itself came from a Rory Delap-esque hurl into the box, and, with the help of a poor clearance, the twenty-one year old Ludwig Kögl flung himself towards it, scoring a glorious diving header; a bewitching finish from an objectionable set-piece strategy, if only we could say the same about Stoke City nowadays.

Porto came out for the second-half with a change in tactics and personnel.  On came ex-Inter striker Juary to partner Paulo Futre, changing the shape into a conventional 4-4-2.  This transformation of shape transformed the dynamic of the game and Bayern found themselves on the back-foot throughout the second-half.  This was surprising given how a back-three was designed to combat the front-two, but this in fact, was the game changing manoeuvre set out by the Porto manager, Artur Jorge.

Futre and Juary ran the channels giving Porto more width, forcing the Bayern wing-backs into more defensive positions, removing the possibility of them moving into midfield.  Because this pinned the wing-backs back, it allowed the Porto midfield and wide midfielders more time and space on the ball.  This move had the further implication of isolating Dieter Hoeneß who was never known for his quick feet and agility to play himself out of a defensive smothering, significant reducing Bayern’s attacking capabilities.

The second-half brought a different defensive approach - - Porto playing with a higher defensive line

Porto played with a higher defensive live too, forcing Bayern, who without a sprightly forward line, into mistakes.  With the lumbering Hoeneß isolated and his midfield distant and outnumbered, Celso, Porto’s ball-playing centre back, could make direct forwards to the feet of Futre, who could link play-up.  When not linking up the play, he looked to do this.

With this small tactical change, Porto looked more confident and throughout the second-half they looked more courageous.  Bayern’s natural conservatism did not help as they looked to play safe throughout the second half by keeping men behind the ball, moving the incentive and momentum on to the Portuguese side.  As the second-half wore on Porto’s midfielders, in particular Rabah Madjer looked to break from midfield and support the attacks.  The elegant Algerian was the hero of the game, scoring with an audacious back-heel and then two minutes later, creating a winner with some stupefying wing-play that set-up the Brazilian Jaury for the winner.

Bayern’s characteristic conservatism contributed to their downfall in 1987 European Cup Final.  Their inability to change things around in a tactical battle that could have easily been won was highlighting.  Artur Jorge altered things around in a way that theoretically would have been a bad decision, but, as this game vindicates, it is often about the philosophy embedded within a team that influences whether a match is won or lost.

I’ve unfortunately been a bit busy recently, rendering me incapable of finding the time to get my teeth into various teams or games that might provide some entertainment.

However, I managed to produce a lengthy piece for the always interesting ‘In Bed With Maradona’  about the modernisation of the English game.  You can find it here, I hope it is of interest.

Barcelona have shuffled their pack in 2010, starting to prefer to Messi to play centrally rather than in the inside right role. Not formed in the archetypal central forward role, his pee-wee frame would perhaps lead some central defenders preferring to battle against the Lilliputian Argentinian.

Defenders may not be straining their Achilles whilst leaping against a monolithic striker but they have to deal with a completely different threat and recently played teams are yet sufficiently dampen Barcelona’s attacking prowess.

Real Madrid and Espanyol offered us a clear illustration on how not to defend against Barcelona with Messi as the centrepiece, both surrendering five goals in the process of defeat.

There are clear similarities between the way José Mourinho and the delightfully named Mauricio Pochettino organised their defence; they defended high up the pitch and looked to narrow the spaces in front of their defence.

Espanyol's high-line

Real Madrid's high-line

Let’s not prevaricate here, such a defensive strategy does not work when Messi plays as a ‘false 9’. He makes the role his own as he potters about the pitch, dropping to such depth that he sometimes looks to pick the ball up from defence.

So what does this mean for central defenders? Well, it means they are often left with nothing to do, left standing around kicking their heels. I would proposition here that instead of enjoying the fact that neither of them have anybody to directly mark that the centre-backs actually feel extremely uncomfortable at the thought of this – it means that they have to become fully aware of their movement and the space around them.

Pepe and Carvalho were often left looking bewildered as they had no one to mark

Messi dropping deep gives the nimblest Argentinean apart from this scantily clad one [NSFW] the opportunity to turn and pass into the acres of space behind the defence, which is where Pedro and David Villa will often be found. The centre-backs do not help themselves here as they often find themselves following Messi’s movement deep, creating a poor defensive line that is easier to penetrate with a piercing through-ball.

The pass leading to the fourth goal

Espanyol decided to allow one of their centre-backs, Juan Forlin, follow Messi, even when he went to go pick up the ball from the defence. This left a situation where the other centre-back was left isolate without help from his full-backs, as they were concentrating on the movements of Villa and Pedro.

Forlin was nominated as the unlucky fellow to track Messi if he dropped deep

Against Real Madrid, Ángel di María was instructed to follow Pedro’s movement, possibly to aid Marcelo who is not the best defensively. This allowed Dani Alves to maraud up and down the right wing as the space was available to do so. This turned the conventional back-four into a back-five which allowed Barcelona to dominate the middle of the park. Barcelona were therefore able to start moves in midfield comfortably and completely dominate the match. This was all down to Mourinho worrying about Pedro scurrying behind their defence.

Madrid's backline regularly consisted of five players

Hércules CF had great success in frustrating Barcelona by dropping deep and restricting the space behind them and came out winners in their game early in the season.  Levante UD went to the Camp Nou on the 2^nd of January and set-up in a similar way and largely frustrated Barcelona but somewhat unluckily left with nothing.  So here’s a New Year’s resolution for all sides pipped against the Catalonian giants – play deep and make Barcelona play in front of you, with a bit of luck, you may come away with something.

Who would have thought it? A one-time player for Wimbledon goes to show tactical discernment and shrewdness. To give Ståle Solbakken his dues, he did fallout with the mullet-wielded Joe Kinnear, so he has got to have something about him, hasn’t he?

Successfully detaching the ‘hoof’ tag from his name has manifested itself in several years at the deliciously named Hamarkameratene (HamKam), and to where he is now, F.C. København.

Obviously, managing these two clubs are not enough to disassociate with the Wimbledon insignia, Ståle needed to do something distract. No, it wasn’t bring Vinnie Jones from the emotionally vacuous hills of Hollywood to Copenhagen; but to create a team sprinkled with the qualities shown as a player; intelligence and enthusiasm.

FCK’s vertebra is a 4-4-2, from which different systems can evolve. As well as being professional footballers, the FCK team are all contortionists, capable of flexing into an array of systems faster than the time it takes for Victor Valdes to knock out Dame N’Doye.

Within the first twenty minutes against Barcelona, FCK had recited the tactical hymnbook and then some. Well, that is a slight exaggeration, but the understanding and implementation of a variety of systems is remarkable. Sketching from a powder consisting of a 4-4-2, FCK transform from a lifelike 4-4-2 to abstract Dali-esque systems.

FCK transmute into a 4-3-3 against Barcelona

Away at Panathinaikos, a game won by the Danish champions-select 2-0, FCK showed the sort of flexibility that causes Paul Daniels to marry. From a rigid ‘two banks of four’ without the ball, FCK transform into a fluid attacking contraption that manifests in a variety of systems on the pitch.

FCK without the ball - a narrow and compact 4-4-2.

A sight more common than a Kerry Katona drug scandal is that of FCK’s right-midfielder, customarily the Costa Rican Christian Bolaños tucking extremely narrow, allowing for the right-back Zdeněk Pospěch to venture forward.

Bolanos (yellow) tucking inside

Not too interesting you say? Well, yes – you would be right. However, these full-backs have a propensity to get forward matched by perhaps only Dani Alves. Often Zdeněk Pospěch was the farthest player forward, with Oscar Wendt often being not far behind him on the opposite site.

This fits with FCK’s strategy off the ball, which is to stay compact and win the ball back through interceptions. As Barcelona discovered, it is difficult to break FCK down, defensively, they are very well organised. When they win the ball back, it requires players to make space to stretch the pitch so they can subsequently move the ball out of their defensive third. Full-backs are quite often the players with the largest amount of space available to move into, making it understandable that Wendt and Pospěch are often the most passed-to players over ninety minutes.

The full-backs desire of space means Bolaños and Martin Vingaard find themselves in central areas quite often, resulting in a 4-2-2-2 shape.

FCK's 4-2-2-2 shape that recurrently appears

Another factor that needs to be illustrated is Dame N’Doye’s tendency to drop deep and hold up the ball.

N'Doye (pink) drops deep to pick up the ball

This allowed Bolaños and Grønkjær to move centrally and look for balls beyond the defensive line. The rationale behind such movement is to expectantly draw central defenders further up the field to find space behind the opposition centre-backs. The movement of Grønkjær is interesting, as he is not used as a traditional second-striker who looks to really create behind N’Doye, but he rather looks to move into the channels or even wider.

Jesper's heatmap against Barcelona - showing how he ran into the wide areas

The once most-expensive Danish football player looks to move in accordance to which centre-back N’Doye has pulled out of position. This creates a position where FCK outnumber the opposition in a certain zone in one area of the pitch.

If FCK do not exploit this outnumbering of opposition through the creation of a goalscoring opportunity, FCK’s compact midfield allows them the option to move the ball back and retain possession.

This brief look into FCK illustrates the flexibility of Ståle Solbakken’s side. They don’t just have two tactical dichotomies, a plan for one set of instances and a plan for another, both mutually exclusive and unable to work in tandem. Solbakken has conceived a team that is comfortable forming several shapes when in possession, able to change their playing style dependent on the shape of the match and ball position.

Jurgen Klopp, sitting on the proverbial throne placed on the zenith of Die Südtribüne, has earned his position of Dortmund royalty this season.

His tenderfoot squad has exceeded expectations, and after thirteen games lead the ‘World’s Best League™’ by seven points.  The path to seniority in the Bundesliga has not been through attritional, grinding football, but with an expansive and unrepressed style.

The numbers are impressive, they’ve scored the most (31), five more than any other team in the division and have conceded the least (8), six less than their competitors.  But we don’t do things by numbers here (apart from painting, naturally), and this startling improvement surely needs to be legitimised through analysis.

Klopp’s men have handed a through old-fashioned thrashings to a few teams this season.  A particular esteemed walloping came at the Hannover after Mirko Slomka’s troops bent over and let Dortmund hand them a kind of spanking once commonplace in Victorian Britain.

It’s easy to understand why Dortmund are top; with an attack as smooth and anointed as a Catholic Priest and a defence as tight and cramped as a Nun’s ‘passage’ – it is as deadly as it is tempting, combination.

The first observation is that all the width comes through the full-backs.  The midfield stays tight, narrow and thoroughly impenetratable.

Dortmund's midfield is extremely narrow, with plenty of bodies in there.

When they push forward, the front trio, instead of staying wide and looking for full-backs to cut inside –  prefer to push forward and join the lone forward, Lucas Barrios.  It says a lot that previous Hertha BSC winger Łukasz Piszczek is now being played in a full-back role – illustrating Dortmund’s attacking tenets this year.

Here, Marcel Schmelzer is providing width on the left...

and crosses for Łukasz Piszczek, the right-back, who has moved forward.

From an attacking sense, they’re incredibly dangerous.  Klopp has unbelievably integrated a physical skill set with a technical proficiency that is only seen in the top European clubs.

Pardon my expressions, but this Dortmund has in its cupboard all the ingredients needed by a modern team to be successful in the long-term.  It has a young, talented batch of German players with a dash of elan and chic discovered in foreign lands.

Put simply, the team is chocker block full of players who are technically able, confident and always looking to receive the ball at feet.  What are the implications of such positive attitudes?  Well, it permits Dortmund to play in tight, narrow areas, without worrying about losing possession.

Their five-some in midfield are capable from passing from deeper positions as well as dropping deep to pick up the ball.  This allows them to transfer from defence into attack within seconds, something that less technically proficient sides really struggle to do.

Dortmund's technical midfield allows them to move the ball with one or two touches, allowing them to exploit poor defensive positioning

Their narrow midfield has another important function too – winning the ball back.  By playing with a very compact midfield and defence, with hardly any spaces between them, the Dortmund defence are great at pushing players into the unyielding arms of the Dortmund midfield.  This makes it very hard for teams to penetrate Dortmund through the middle, as their defence are not afraid to move forward and chase opposition forwards into their own half.

Subotic and Hummels are both only twenty-one – the youngest defence pairing in the Bundesliga – and have taken to Klopp’s high-line and pressing defensive philosophy like that proverbial duck to water.  Subotic may not be the most mobile of defenders, but Mats Hummels has the speed to cover for him if he’s moved too far out of position.

The pressing usually starts when the ball moves into the midfield or out-wide to the full-backs, however Kagawa and Barrios like to step forward and stop the easy ball in to the midfield, all the whilst Sahin and Bender are sitting off the central midfielders, ready to pounce if the ball moves to them.  Mario Götze and Kevin Großkreutz attempt to stop the ball moving to the full-backs – making it difficult for the opposition to really start moves off.

Kagawa and Barrios stop easy balls in to midfield. Sahin and Bender look to drop a few yards deep from midfield to intercept passes.

An obvious response to this is to by-pass the midfield, which was seen when Freiburg playing Dortmund last weekend.  Freiburg were quite unlucky to lose 2-1, and Freiburg did well to contain Dortmund until a ten minute period in the second-half.  Their gameplan consisted of using Papiss Cissé’s strength and ability (must refrain from using ‘good touch for a big man’) to move the ball forward quickly.  Freiburg’s narrow five-man midfield looked to offer support for Cissé – and it worked for the best part of 90 minutes.

Łukasz Piszczek: a copy & paste name if I’ve ever seen one

Łukasz Piszczek is an interesting proposition at right-back. Used primarily as a winger at Hertha Berlin for a long period of time, he’s successfully transformed himself into a competent right-back. He’s used very well at Dortmund his attacking forays into the attacking third are something to keep your eye on – in particular, his movement in-field was something that was extremely common – or, for its correct terminology – ‘something straight off the training ground.’

Łukasz Piszczek starts the move, moving the ball to Mario Götze, who places himself on the sideline; dragging the full-back forward and wide.

Kagawa follows the movement and drops deep, moving the centre-back out with him, creating a Piszczek-sized gap for him to run into when Kagawa moves the ball to him.

Often you see full-backs exploiting the space in wider positions and behind the full-backs, it’s rather novel seeing a full-back cutting inside and finding himself with shooting opportunities. As with the Portuguese international, Fábio Coentrão, Łukasz Piszczek finds himself as a winger being used well in a deeper position.

The attacking intent shown by Łukasz Piszczek has its downfalls, with Dortmund’s defence finding themselves sometimes rather stretched, with the space between centre-backs being large enough for even the most monolithic of strikers to move into.

Piszczek's attacking movements sometimes causes splits in the Dortmund defence.

Nuri Sahin: a left-foot crafted in the womb of Virgin Mary, made specifically for Dortmund

The German-born Turkish midfielder is the creator and provider of all things beautiful for this Dortmund side. Against Hannover and HSV his one-touch passing and movement allowed Dortmund to move the ball quickly and into dangerous spaces whilst his piercing longer passes often dissected the cumbersome Hannover defence. In this video, the first two goals illustrate how Sahin is able to place the ball exactly where his teammates want it. Due to the way Dortmund play, in intricate, tight arenas, Sahin’s precision with the ball is fundamental to the success of this team.

From a tactical point of view, the narrow attacking midfielders create migraine-sized headaches for the opposition.

Götze & Großkreutz: Two Double G’s that have nothing to do with Hip-Hop

As mentioned, Mario Götze and Kevin Großkreutz rarely stay on the sidelines, preferring to find pockets of space between midfield and defence in central areas. Kagawa, put simply, just moves.

The troublesome trio operate tightly together and centrally.

However, it’s the two German youngsters that provide difficulties for the opposition.

They operate in areas where there is not a direct opposition player designated to combat their effectiveness. Although ‘in the hole’ players may now be meeting their match with the increasing importance of defensive midfielders, players who operate in the channels and deeper can be now seen with relatively the same importance.

Why are Götze and Großkreutz effective this season? Well, it forces the opposition to make a decision on who is going to pick them up.

If they leave them in the realm of central midfielders responsibility, they’ll be outnumbered unless they play with two or three deep central midfielders; this also leaves the full-backs as largely redundant.

If the opposition instruct their full-back to pick them up, it allows them to have a spare man in the middle of the park to close down whoever the manager instructs or to sit and be used as a spare man. Dortmund, however, have options to rebuff this tactical repositioning.

The problem is Kagawa is a clever little player. He knows when to move wide to drag players with him, creating space for Götze or Großkreutz to play with. Kagawa has a very Ozil-esque left-foot, which is able to design and create a first-time ball through a defence from wider areas of the pitch.

The attacking quartet (+Piszczek) is able to create sparkling football at times; their movement quick and incisive, only matched by their penetrative passing and two-touch football. Klopp has them organised in such a way that they can respond to the opposition’s organisation as well as being hard to play against. Their youth allows them to press for seventy minutes without changes, and, by that time, the game is usually over. Teams without a clear game-plan or midfield players capable of handling the tenacity of the ‘Die Borussen’ will struggle to play through the middle of the park.

It’s not that the quartet has technical ability; they have power and pace and the ability to cut-through a defensive line with one run. Their right-side is always dangerous, with the pacey Jakub Błaszczykowski often coming off the bench to replace Mario Götze.

It’s easy to understand why out of all the top leagues in Europe that Dortmund have scored the third most (after Real Madrid & Barcelona, respectively) and have conceded the same amount as Barcelona (even if they don’t dominate games as much as the Catalan giants do). Jurgen Klopp has concocted a delicious mix of technical adroitness and physical accomplishment to propel his Dortmund team to the top of the Bundesliga after 13 games.

Bespectacled Jurgen Klopp is animated on the pitch, never giving the fourth official, his face – or anything else for that matter – a moments rest. His energy and youthful exuberance has been disseminated throughout his team – from the defence to the attack, Dortmund are spasmodic, yet paradoxically, have a fluidity of a team who have been playing together for years.

We may just be looking at the Bundesliga champions this year…

The re-birth of Villarreal has come with the fruition of several events.  Firstly, the partnership that Brazilian Nilmar and the Italian-American Giuseppe Rossi has cultivated week-on-week will continue to be one of the most dangerous in La Liga.  The two have scored eleven of Villarreal’s nineteen goals and Rossi has shown ruthless finishing that was once missing; Nilmar, as well as scoring five goals, is joint third in the assist rankings up to this point.

There has been a significant structural change to the Villarreal side too this season.  Under Juan Carlos Garrido, who was the Villarreal B manager for eight years before his promotion to the first-team, they have returned to the tactical structure employed during Manuel Pellegrini’s stint at the Valencian club.

At Villarreal B, Garrido oversaw the promotion from the Tercera División after finishing third, fifth, first and then second.  This saw them get promoted to Segunda División B, and after two seasons, saw them get promoted to the Spain equivalent of the Championship, the Segunda División.  This success was in glorious alignment with the rise of Villarreal in La Liga and increasing competitiveness in Europe under Pellegrini.

The now Malaga CF manager was a firm believer in his Brazilian style 4-2-2-2.  The attacking midfielders, also known as the interiores, played very narrow and looked to form a creative spine in the middle of the field – while the full-backs provided the width.  This blueprint changed under interim manager Ernesto Valverde who looked to press higher.  The implementation of such strategy failed and Villarreal subsequently dropped to the terrifying depths of the Relegation zone.  As the Blue Öyster Cult once sang, “Oh no, they say he’s got to go.”

With Garrido, this samba style is back! (Yes, yet another song – if you read the rest of this blog post in the background it will give you a whole new blogging experience) It is the revival of the interiores and with it has come the sparkling football that the El Submarino Amarillos were once revered for.  Filling in these fundamental slots in the side is the ex-Baggies midfielder Borja Valero complete with a new bald head and Santi Cazorla, and when either of them are out, the €11 million man, Cani.  Their defensive responsibilities in the team have been delegated to Bruno Soriano, a product of the heavily-invested (€42m don’t you know) Villarreal academy, and the ever-present yet never-ageing Marcos Senna.

The transformation of this Villarreal scarily bears resemblance to many men’s sexual feelings towards Twiggy.  You definitely would have in her younger form (Pellegrini era), then you kind of forgot she existed for a bit, and now with M&S advert-Twiggy, of you course you bloody well would.  Juan Carlos Garrido is what RKCR/YR is to Twiggy.

An examination of Villarreal’s 2-0 win over Atletico shows the resurrection of Pellegrini’s 4-2-2-2 perfectly (and takes readers away from the plodding analogy that delves deep into my sexual consciousness).

Defenders are marked white; deeper midfielders, yellow; interiores, pink and strikers are marked cyan

 

This system is not as rigid as the classification of formations suggests.  The aforementioned interiores move at will to the wide positions if the full-backs are deep, which helps the movement of the ball forward.

Cani (yellow) shows that the system is flexible

A quick examination of Cani’s counterpart Santi Carzola’s heatmap shows the role of both players.

Santi Cazorla and his drifting around the pitch

Nevertheless, it is not in the wide positions that the likes of Santi Cazorla are dangerous – it is when they move inside and as well as providing ammunition for the front-two, they can run in beyond the defensive line.

This movement is helped by the mobility of both Nilmar and Rossi, who both drop deep to close down and to link the play.  For the first goal against Atletico, Nilmar fought for the ball against two opposition players before running  at the back-four and passing the ball through for the on-rushing Cani, who had found space in between the centre and full-back due to Rossi’s run wide.

Villarreal's first goal against Atletico illustrating the flexibility of the front-four.

It is this strong central area that allows Villarreal to play attractive football; they can keep possession by finding triangles through the middle as well as spreading the ball wide thanks to the full-backs.  The strength in the middle of the park constricts the opposition defence too, as quite often a back-four narrows to restrict the spaces in the middle.  The result is that Villarreal’s full-backs often have plenty of space in-front of them to run into and can be found easily.  Juan Capdevilla’s heatmap shows how progressive he is in this system.

Juan Capdevilla's maurading runs and constant backtracking is impressive.

Going back to the previous point; the formation really allows for several players to play in between the lines.  It’s quite obvious how this happens, but an examination of how the system cultivates attacking options for Villarreal has some value.

It gives Villarreal plenty of options with the ball for starters; (1) the interiores,if they are marked by the central midfielders, can move to the wings to free up some space.  The central midfielder marking Cani or Cazorla can chase them, but this would leave space for a pass to be made to the front-men.  However, if the interiores movement out wide is the responsibility of the full-back to cover, then the centre forward can move into the space left by the departing full-back (2).

What was commonplace however was that the Atletico central midfielders attempted to close down Senna or Bruno, which left huge gaps in-front of the central defence for Cani and Cazorla to move in to.   There was always an easy pass to play for them to link midfield with attack.

Cazorla & Cani always found space between midfield and defence

This inevitably sucks in the full-backs, which then leaves acres of space open for the full-backs to wander into.  The flexibility and ability to move the opposition defence around is what makes the interiores such a valuable position in this system.  This space creation for the full-backs led to the second goal, a Giuseppe Rossi masterpiece, but founded in the forward-thinking left-back, Juan Capdevilla.

Capdevilla & Angel are always available to stretch the pitch

The success of this system relies fundamentally on the talents of the full-backs and the interiores. It is these players who are the ones who have the potential to change the dynamic of the attack and the organisation of the defence.  The full-backs are fundamental space creators in this system, as they can stop the opposition defence becoming too narrow and restricting the space for the interiores and strikers to work with.

The sturdy defensive block that makes it hard for the opposition to play through

As shown by the lack of goals conceded this season (7 in total), it has a strong defensive foundation based on a solid quartet in the defensive third.  Senna, Bruno, Carlos Marchena and Gonzalo Rodriguez look to move together tightly, never allowing space to appear between them.  In the majority of cases, this forces the ball wide where it is less dangerous – and even if a ball makes it into the box, Carlos Marchena will most likely be on the end of it.

Such defensive stability and attacking flexibility has led to an outpouring of love in the Spanish media.  From AS to Marca, the dailies have been banding around poetic verses that even the Poet laureate would find hard to equal.  Have a look at this chef d’oeuvre from El Pais, “there is a team coming up behind those footballing locomotives Madrid and Barcelona: Villarreal, a delight of a team that builds passing triangles, that links up wonderfully, that moves like angels …”. Biblical undertones make everyone feel warmer inside I feel.

Regardless, the quality of the football on display at the El Madrigal is tantamount to the quality on display in the previous seasons under Pellegrini, where they over-achieved with minimal fuss and maximum flair.  Garrido has reintroduced the unvarying principles that were a constant under the Chilean’s reign and the reintroduction into the Champions League is surely no less than a certainty this season.

It was no surprise that Liverpool lost the 214th Merseyside derby given their woeful start to the season. No Liverpool fan, not even the most pessimistic of follower, would have fathomed such baffling results and such perturbing performances on the field given the strength of their squad at the start of the season.

With some trading-up and trading-down from both Rafael Benitez and Roy Hodgson over the past couple of seasons, the majority of the Liverpool team still remain from the title challenging season of 2008-09. Crippled by the Hick’s and Gillett’s unwillingness to service the promises they provided when they took over the club, Liverpool stumbled around the Premier League last season, like a common drunk who is just about on their last legs before slumping face first into the bar.

Nevertheless, even during this turbulent period, Liverpool have managed to save face in Merseyside by having a good record over their neighbours. David Moyes admitted before the match that his team’s record against Liverpool was frustrating. Moyes speaks the truth here; from twelve Premier League Merseyside derbies, Rafael Benitez oversaw 8 wins, 2 draws and 2 losses – an impressive record in a game where it is often said that “anything can happen – it depends who wants it more ad nauseum ad nauseum” and “you can never predict anything in such a game.”

On the run up to the latest league Derby, Everton hadn’t won one in the last seven matches. Roy Hodgson should have had confidence in his squad to continue such a run. This confidence was unlikely to be shared by anyone who has seen the performances of Hodgson’s Liverpool side and Everton were likely to seize their chance and notch up a needed win against their homebody.

But to start, a look at English football reporting lexicon

Match reports that follow a Derby follow a familiar trend; there are usual hints towards the losing team ‘wanting it less’ or the team ‘lacked the passion and adrenaline. Such phrases are often hackneyed and rarely describe the actual match situation, throwing any real observations out for worn-out and banal expressions. It’s alarming how many military-based phrases are used in football reporting; such parlances are only used because it has fit with the English idea of football being ‘a battle’ where ‘no men can hide’. Such mutterings are hyped-up beyond belief when it comes down to a local rivalry, with my favourite phrase being ‘he’s the type of man you need in the trenches’ – what utter twoddle. Whereas football in Europe is seen as a mobilised version of Chess, in England, military metaphors are rife and illustrates the strength of one particular team and any mention of tactical problems are often not noted. When it comes to a derby, Rafael Honigstein has it right when he says “in England, tactics is another word for weakness.”

I don’t accept the nauseating excuse of Liverpool lacking passion or desire; these players have played at the highest level and don’t bottle it as some commentators would lead you to believe. There is a proper answer to why Liverpool lost at the weekend and it’s to do with Hodgson’s organisation of his team.

The main criticism of Hodgson has been his complete turnaround in the way Liverpool play without the ball. Hodgson’s Liverpool aim to sit deep and keep their shape – this is no surprise, it is well documented that Hodgson’s training methods are primarily based on team shape and defensive structure

Such methods are a stark contrast compared to Liverpool’s pressing game under Rafael Benitez, who if there was a ‘Arrigo Sacchi Fan Club’, he would undoubtedly be the first one to join, giving him to a free Saachi face-mask as well as a year’s membership. Not only did fans like Benitez’s proactive methods, the team reacted well to the constriction of space and forcing the opposition into mistakes. This made Liverpool notably hard to play against; Wesley Sneijder, after Real Madrid’s 4-0 loss at Anfield in 2009, stated how difficult it was to see Madrid players amongst the wall of red shirts that surrounded him every time he picked up the ball.

Such philosophy has now been dismantled and Liverpool’s new defensive mantra is around keeping a deeper line, which has a knock-on effect in all areas of the pitch. This was clearly illustrated in the Derby.

Liverpool deep defensive line

By playing a deeper line, it results in there being larger spaces in between the midfield and defence if the game is stretched. In the shot below, the gap between Skrtel and Meireles is so big it even allows Yakubu to stand beneath them without either of them touching him (a cheap shot, I know). Such large gaps allow Everton to pass around and keep possession in dangerous areas of the pitch without much disturbance.

Yakubu illustrates how large the gap between midfield and defence sometimes is

Keeping with the terminology of the recent CSR, such a deep-line has a multiplier effect. Firstly, as mentioned already, it allows Everton plenty of time to and space to find a teammate because of the space available to them. Secondly, when Liverpool win the ball-back, they’re starting from a deeper position without an obvious out-ball – this is because the midfielders are now so deep that passing the ball to them will place them in a precarious position where they will immediately be put under pressure. With midfielders now deeper to help protect the back-four, it leads to a huge a gap between them and the forward line meaning the direct ball to the centre forward will be fruitless. However, such route one ideas are the only sure-fire way of relieving the pressure and Liverpool often went long, an act that fans do not revere to.

Everton had the right idea in the first-half, they looked to press and put real pressure onto the Liverpool back-line and midfielders. Without Daniel Agger, Liverpool look nervous at the back and Everton really made Martin Skrtel and Sotoris Kyrigakos wish they had brought a second pair of undies to Goodison Park. This pressure from Everton led to Liverpool passing it around at the back in a useless fashion, or hoofing it up to Torres for try and make something out of it.

Everton's relentless pressing in the first-half

A look at the Guardian chalkboards shows how Liverpool’s defence passed amongst themselves, rarely looking to the midfield in the middle of the park. This is especially illustrated in the first-half where Liverpool have a non-existent midfield. With Everton pressing so ferociously, the Liverpool defence had little choice to try longer balls, bypassing the midfield.

By dropping so deep, it leads to an unbreakable cycle of inviting pressure, smashing it long, losing the ball, allow the opposition to keep possession and then when they win it back deep, the cycle starts all over again

In the first 20 minutes Liverpool only passed the ball from inside Everton's half two times.

In the opening twenty minutes, Liverpool only attempted two pass whilst in Everton’s half. Such a statistic just goes to show how Everton penned Liverpool into their own half. This was a product of playing such a rigid defensive system where midfielders are now so deep they cannot link the play.

Another aspect of the Derby was Liverpool’s lack of invention and penetration when they actually have the ball.

David Moyes admitted just as much after the game, stating:

“After we got the second goal, I was happy to concede possession to Liverpool. It wasn`t a problem. They haven`t been scoring. One or two were too close for comfort but we also had opportunities on the break to get a third goal.”

It’s a clear indictment of the problems suffered by Hodgson’s Liverpool when a team isn’t worried about whether Liverpool have the ball or not. Some may have seen Everton’s tactics in the second-half as them trying to give Liverpool a lifeline but for those who have the displeasure of watching Liverpool this season know that creativity and penetration are not attributes that can be aligned to the Liverpool class of 2010-11.

Examining the second-half passing chalkboards from Liverpool shows a dreary trend – that the ball only moved sideways. There were only three successful balls into the box throughout the whole game. The chalkboard reads like a flightmap to and from London Heathrow and it just illustrates the lack of invention, creativity and confidence infused within the Liverpool players at the moment. Without a plan of attack, Liverpool found themselves launching it into the box in an act of desperation.

Flightmaps are just as interesting as Liverpool's passing chalkboards

Looking back to previous seasons…

For Liverpool, such trends are in stark comparison to the Merseyside match-ups seen in previous seasons. The following section will look at Liverpool’s 2-0 win away at Everton last year.

There was little difference between the way the teams lined up and Everton’s off-the-ball methods – they pressed high up the pitch and kept a high line.

Liverpool on the other hand looked a completely different team both on and off the ball. On the ball they moved with purpose and obviously had a game-plan. Their movement was quick and penetrative, helping to provide a base for Liverpool to keep possession and control the match, something that cannot be said for many of Liverpool’s games under Roy Hodgson.

There are marked differences in the use of wide players in this 2-0 Liverpool win. Both Kuyt and Aurelio stay predominantly wide and high up the pitch. This stopped Everton’s full-backs getting forward and joining the midfield or looking for the overlap further up the pitch. This allows Liverpool’s full-backs, Johnson and Insua space to run into and join the midfield and time their runs into the final third.

Aurelio (red) and Insua (yellow) were a great attacking threat last year

These two players had a great influence over the game, constantly getting forward and pinning back Everton’s wide midfielders and making it hard for them to build from the back or support the Everton forward line if they went direct.

However, as with Everton’s win this year, the crux of the victory was Liverpool’s ability to win the ball back high up the pitch and cause mistakes. An examination of the interceptions in both games highlights the differences in philosophy between Rafa Benitez and Roy Hodgson.

This pressing high up the field was also compounded by Liverpool’s high line and offside trap that worked well against Jo. This approach is vastly different to the one employed by Roy Hodgson.

For the players and the fans, such pressing psychologically affects the game. A team are wary about being closed down so they’re more likely to play a footballing version of ‘hot potato’ – constantly moving around without taking much responsibility in fear of making a mistake. Last weekend, Everton had time to think and make their mind up about where they wanted to send the ball.

This Liverpool pressing had a knock-on effect, it allowed the front four to stay forward and expect a pass from midfield or defence. A marked problem in the derby last weekend was Joe Cole’s defensive duties and lack of opportunities to play higher up the pitch. His passing chalkboard shows how he spent vast majorities of his time helping the defence and trying to get Liverpool out of tight spots. This resulted in Torres having no support and nobody to link up with. In the previous year, Fabio Aurelio stayed wide and looked to link up with his fellow attacking trio.

Joe Cole's extra defensive work

This is a condensed version of events over the two games and just illustrates some of the differences between the two managers and the way they set up to play in a Merseyside Derby. It is a worry that Roy Hodgson believes his methods from Fulham can be replicated with the same “success” at a bigger club, he has shown a distinct lack of flexibility and understanding of how to manage the Liverpool squad and adapt his methods to players at his disposal.

This match was not lost on accounts of lack of passion or any of that nonsense, it’s just simply that Liverpool were hindered by Roy Hodgson’s overly defensive and negative system that has continually negated the attacking talents of this Liverpool side.

Amidst an aura of optimism and calls of ‘reincarnation’, Romania were close to ruining Laurent Blanc’s quietly-impressive start to his reign as Les Bleus’ national coach this week.

Instead of opting for the 4-3-3 that got the French a formidable win against a Bosnia side, M. Blanc preferred the 4-2-3-1 system with the fleet-footed Samir Nasri picked for the role behind Karim Benzema, leaving Yoann Gourcuff, who, it has to be said, is lacking form of any definition at the moment, on the bench. France won this game two to nothing, which at first glance, is an adequate and expected result, but it was only through late goals and some much-needed changes late in the day.

Blanc said post-match:

“A match lasts 90 or even 95 minutes, so there’s no point just analysing the first 75,”

Laurent Blanc may have dismissed the idea that his team were made to look like equals by an organised and well-drilled Romania side, but it was only until late in the game when two well-thought substitutions entered the fray that the French looked like deserved winners.

There is a point though – to discover how a French team were nullified for the first 75 minutes by a Romanian team who are now ranked lower than Northern Ireland in the FIFA World Rankings – and how Romania managed to continually look dangerous on the counter. As an aside, the decline of Romanian football is astonishing – it was only in 1997 that the Romanian side were ranked #3 in the World Rankings and had the likes of Gheorghe Hagi and Adrian Ilie in their ranks.

With five minutes to go in the first-half, one could sense there were going to be spluttering jeers at the point of half-time. Although the French monopolised the first-half, the Tricolorii worked hard without the ball and countered dangerously when they won the ball back.

The first-half can be characterised by looking at the shape of the Romanian side – they were narrow, organised and pressed in specific areas.

Romania's basic shape without the ball.

Romania were narrow and extremely organised, always keeping strong 'linkages' between each position.

There’s been mention of pressing the opposition full-backs to help implement a specific game in a previous post, and the Romanian’s were very quick to press Gael Clichy and Anthony Réveillère as soon as they got the ball. This resulted in the French having to pass back to the centre-backs and start off moves again. It also brought Valbuena and Malouda deeper and deeper, as they looked to aid the stuttering full-back. In the first-half, when the French had control of possession, Romania compressed their half of the pitch very well – leaving the Les Bleus floundering in the final third

Romania pressed as soon as the ball moved forward from defence.

The struggle to get the ball forward for sustained periods of time resulted in the French forwards having to drop deeper to move the ball forward. This allowed Romania to compress their half sufficiently enough so it halted any French moves building up. The Romanians aimed to allow the French centre-backs have the ball as much as they want, but as soon as the ball moved to someone else, the Romanians pressed.

These trends continued into the second-half – Romania continued to break well and place everyone behind the ball – and it is only down to a spectacular save from Hugo Lloris that Romania didn’t open the scoring.

What was notable was Karim Benzema’s tendency to drop very wide, sometimes in between full-back and centre-back, sometimes between the full-back and the sideline. This caused a shift in the French attack, it brought Malouda to a more central position, Valbuena further forward and centrally and Nasri pushed on. This movement also brought overlapping runs from Gael Clichy. This progression to a more fluid attack continued throughout the match, even with new introductions entering the game.

Benezema continued to drift deep and wide throughout the game.

The simple twisting of the French attack made the team striker-less during some periods – a footballing trend that has been developing for some time now. This did not have its desired effect, the Romanians kept a solid defensive shape throughout this period where Benzema drifted to the left – rendering the change pretty ineffective. Without anyone looking to dissect the Romanian defensive line, it was very easy to keep a narrow and high-line, the passing was not penetrative enough to have the Romanians scrambling. Valbuena, for as good as he is with the ball at his feet, is not a winger or forward who looks to run beyond the defensive line. Without anyone to do this, the French style of play was attractive yet lacked an incisive edge.

Benzema and Nasri managed to get the Parisians to pick up their drapeau tricolore and wave them without a hint of hypocrisy after their half-time boos. Both managed to squander the clearest of opportunities in the game. The Romanians however looked to exploit Clichy’s poor decision making the rashness in his movement forward.

It was only until M. Blanc made some attacking changes that the dynamic of the game changed. Until this point, Les Bleus were happy to play in front of the Romanian back-four, never really looking to stretch the defensive line. Valbuena, who looked to play in between the lines was replaced by the pacy and direct Loïc Rémy on the right. Remy moved higher up the pitch, looking to run at the left-back and to move into a auxiliary centre-forward position when Benzema drifted wide.

With Remy now able to stretch the Romanians in midfield and defence, it gave France a stronger hold on the game.

Remy continued to scare the Romanian defence with his runs from outside inwards and it was from an Alou Diarra through-ball over the top that Loïc Rémy chased and broke the deadlock.

Remy's runs left greater space between the midfield and defence, as well as providing a different method of attack.

Rémy’s goal itself showed his terrific pace and composure whilst running at speed. Even with a Romanian central defender bearing down on him, he managed to get his shot away without hesitation or second-thoughts – it really was an impressive goal.

An intelligent move from Blanc; recognising that the Romanians could handle the ball being playing in front of their defence, the introduction of pace and finishing ability changed the game. The Romanians, who were pushing higher up the pitch as the game wore on, were un-done by their high-line and the introduction of Remy. The French style of play for the previous 80 minutes drew the Romanians into a defensive lull – and rightly so, they had reduced France to only a few chances, but this lack of adaptability to the introduction of Remy was their ruin.

The crafty débutante Dmitri Payet was introduced soon after the Rémy goal and his composure and vision in the box added some much-needed gloss to the scoreline. The two-nil win made the France supporters go home with achy wrists as they continued to waggle their flags for the last five minutes, symbolically showing acceptance of a French performance that could have been, if it wasn’t for Rémy, a frustrating and dissatisfying display.

Denmark’s victory in the Euro Championships in 1992 had all the ingredients of a unforgetful footballing fairytale. It is the story of a team who didn’t qualify for the finals who went onto win the thing, beating the World Champions, the French and the Dutch; surely this would be a story that was woven into the tapestry of footballing folklore?

The story itself starts well. As aforementioned, they failed to reach the finals in Sweden. In fact, they only got told that they were due to take part in the finals as they were preparing for a friendly against CIS. With the players wishing they were somewhere else, not playing a stinking friendly against the ‘ruddy commies’, manager, Richard Moller Nielsen, was looking to renovate his kitchen. So far, so good – - it contains them not actually qualifying through merit and a quirky story about a manager who was doing DIY in the summer. This surely must be a magical story and team!

It was only the trepid war situation in Yugoslavia that led to Denmark going to the championships. I can only presume that Mrs. Nielsen went without her kitchen that summer. If Denmark didn’t win this tournament, it would probably be remembered as the most boring of all International tournaments, for its goals per games were less than that of the much (and rightly so) maligned 1990 World Cup.

Now everyone is thinking, “Gee, this story sounds lovely! A team beat everyone’s expectations to go on and win! I bet they played wonderful football too!” Sorry to smash all illusions but no, Denmark played an anger-inducing defensive game.

It was left to Brian Laudrup to provide the entertainment, creativity and fleet-footed wizardry. Around him, the Danish team were full of straight-backed, no-nonsense, steel-toe capped defensive workers.

The reason why they won was obvious; they had little expectation on their extremely broad, Nordic shoulders. John Jensen, who would after this tournament, move to Arsenal, says it as it is, “There was no pressure on us at all, we could relax and just go out and play.” There was already cohesion in the team, as eight of the team had played together at some point at Danish super-club, Brondby.

John Jensen scoring in the Final vs. Germany

Denmark didn’t have an easy run to become the champions though. They drew with England in their first game, and then lost to the attack-minded Swedes before beating France in the final group game, 2-1. Jean-Marie Papin scored France’s goal after eventual joint top-scorer, Henrik Larsen scored in the first ten minutes. Denmark were down and out as things stood but fate changed when Lars Elstrup, the former Luton Town player, scored in the 78th minute. This sent the Danes through to a semi-final between the Netherlands, who had names such as van Basten, Bergkamp and Rijkaard in their first eleven. After scoring early, Denmark looked to hold onto their lead but both Bergkamp and Rijkaard scored after Henrik Larsen, once of Aston Villa (played no games), scored two precious goals. It went to penalties and it was van Basten who missed his to send Nielsen’s men to the final.

The Final against the World Champions, Germany

Their opponents here were a newly reformed Germany. The West Germany side of 1990, the World Cup winners, had majority rule over this side, with only the ginger-haired Matthias Sammer being East German. With Karl-Heinz Riedle and Jurgen Klinsmann up-front and DM15 man-Thomas Häßler behind them, they were a potent attacking side. For the German deity Franz Beckenbauer, this team, will “probably be unbeatable for years”. This was meant to be the next arena for Germany to show off their footballing talents and the next step in world domination. It wasn’t.

The Euro 92 Final symbolised a new trend in football – the flat-back four. This was while Germany continued playing their sweeper system that had proved so successful in 1990 for them. It was this new defensive platform that typified everything ‘Danish’ in 1992.

In the opening exchanges, the ball moved around each defence without much direction behind it – - like watching school children playing Rounders, throwing the ball around each post – - it was excruciatingly painful. This was natural given the emphasis on having extra numbers in defence for each team. Klinsmann was the only person looking to harry the Danish defenders whilst the German five-man defence easily outnumbered the Danish strikers and wingers. It was boring, bland and a thoroughly wet contest.

Nevertheless, always trust a Laudrup to liven proceedings. From his position supporting the lone striker, he gradually found himself dropping deeper and deeper, picking up the ball in midfield positions and playing quick passes to the midfielders running into the spaces he left. This movement sparked the game – - the passes were quicker, the movement sharper and the amount of shots increased.

This movement was calculated and intelligent. By playing in a traditional second-striker role, he found himself being marked by the countless German defenders. They often stepped up the pitch to go and mark him out of the game; they were comfortable doing this because they knew they had a sweeper and central defender behind them to help if Laudrup evaded their tackles.

This movement was not the catalyst for Denmark’s first goal, however. It came from a routine and predictable hoof out of Peter Schmeichel’s hands. The alehouse punt ended up on the head of the Danish #9, who, up until that point, only looked to lose the ball with a heavy touch at every opportunity. Nevertheless, it was his poorly directed header to the wings that caused some calamitous defending from both teams – - between two German and two Danish players, they managed to slide tackle eachother once and it was the Danish slide-tackle that led to the now, wonderful #9, Povlsen, sending a ball to John Jensen on the fringes of the penalty box – - who confidently put right foot through the ball, sending it past Bodo Illgner, who ducked as it flew past his head, looking to protect his face from a Jensen thunderbolt.

Germany looked to get into the game; particularly Sammer and Effenberg, who looked to grab the game by its gooch and drag it to look like something resembling entertainment. Their penetration through the Danish midfield stopped as soon as they reached the Danish backline though, whose narrowness caused an impenetrable Danish barrier of pink, fleshy meat. This narrowness was the natural position for the Danish, who did not have any direct wingers to close down. The German width all had to come through their two wing backs, Brehme and Reuter – - however, they struggled to get forward with the pace that Sammer and Effenberg were moving defence into attack. Everything therefore went through the middle of the pitch, restricting the options that Denmark had to worry about. For all the huffing and puffing from the German midfielders, the Danish were happy to sit and restrict the space in the middle of the park.

The narrowness of the Danish defence is clear to see.

When the Germans did get the ball to their wing-backs in advanced areas of the pitch, the Danish defence were as tall as the oldest of Redwoods and defended admirably.

The role of Klinsmann played in the Danish defence too. Jurgen cut an isolated figure up-front, Reidle looked nervous to get too involved with the physical Danish defence and floated around to find spaces, without really influencing the game. Klinsmann was being man-marked tightly by Piechnik whose mobility was considerably better than his partner, Olsen. As seen in Italia 90, Klinsmann used his pace to drop deep quickly and link the play – - against Piechnik, he was not allowed time to collect the ball and lay it off – - whilst Olsen sat deeper and read the play, playing as an auxiliary sweeper. With nobody looking to run beyond Klinsmann, Olsen was comfortable at just reading and tidying up when needed.

Klinsmann was always marked tightly by one centre-back, usually Piechnik...

... where Olsen was always looking to pick up the loose ball.

As the first-half progressed, Denmark resorted to the purest of time-wasting tactics – - passing the ball between the defence and then passing it back to Schmeichel, who started the whole process off. Denmark were just looking to hold onto the lead, nothing else. This was not, in anyway, pretty, romantic or idyllic football.

The second-half started off very much in the same vein. Denmark put eight people behind the ball, dropped deep and made Germany try and play through them. Without wide players in the final third, Germany had no method of creating gaps in between the defence and midfield. With Germany and Berti Vogts so stubbornly committed to their 5-3-2 system, there was only going to be one eventual winner.

To their credit, Germany did commit more men forward. With the Danish wide midfielders playing so narrow, Brehme and Reuter felt they could really become part of the midfield. This led to Germany dominating the second-half possession wise.

This did not worry Denmark, they were comfortable placing everyone apart from Laudrup and the limited Povlsen, behind the ball. This was not a match for a neutral; each team struggled to weave passes together. For Germany, it was because of the Denmark defence and just pure outnumbering in every area of their half; whilst for Denmark, they were unbelievably limited technically and apart from the odd counter-attack, looked to solidify any correct stereotype of them being a defensive side.

Sticking everyone behind the ball was the name of the game in the second-half too

The second goal came from a lucky break, an obvious handball and a cultured turn and an accurate strike. Only two out of those four important events actually are positive or showed the Danish team had any attacking quality whatsoever. Denmark went on to win the game 2-0, with a cloud of disappointment inevitably hanging over the stadium, as the game was unbearably poor and scrappy.

As seen in 2004, defensive-sides can win European championships. This one, like Rehhagel’s Greek side, stuck to its strengths and played to them wonderfully. Creative? No. Innovative? No. Entertaining to watch? Oh dear no. Frustrating to watch and a happened to chance themselves some lucky breaks? You bet’cha!

Denmark, for all criticism aimed at them, were impressive. Their defensive mindset and layout looked remarkably similar to the shape deployed by Ottmar Hitzfeld with the Swiss National Team at the World Cup, so in a sense, their approach was modern and innovative. Playing with a thick batch of eight players will continue to be a strategy for a manager who has such defensively minded players in their squad.

What it does show however, that quite often behind narratives proclaiming a tournaments romanticism and the ever-present ‘underdog’ mentality – - it is quite often lies and pure fabrications. This Denmark team, for all their success, showed little to capture the imagination of viewers and in fact, when you think about the Danish National Team, you hark back to the era of the Danish Dynamite in the 80’s. Albeit unsuccessful, the team was packed full of exciting, spontaneous players such as Preben Elkjær, Michael Laudrup and Jan Molby. In fact, Michael Laudrup refused to play under Richard Moller Nielson, precisely because he felt the team had no place for his ad-lib genre of football. That, itself, tells the whole story of the Danish team in 1992.